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The Black Man’s Burden: The Cost of 
Colonization of French West Africa 
?
ELISE HUILLERY
Was colonization costly for France? Did French taxpayers contribute to colonies’ 
development? This article reveals that French West Africa’s colonization took only 
0.29 percent of French annual expenditures, including 0.24 percent for military and 
central administration and 0.05 percent for French West Africa’s development. For 
West Africans, the contribution from French taxpayers was almost negligible: 
mainland France provided about 2 percent of French West Africa’s revenue. In fact, 
colonization was a considerable burden for African taxpayers since French civil 
servants’ salaries absorbed a disproportionate share of local expenditures. 
n 23 February 2005 the French Parliament adopted a law requiring 
history textbooks to recognize the positive role of colonization 
(law n° 2005-1581). The proponents of this law argued that French 
colonization had given the colonies massive investments in education, 
health, and infrastructure that facilitated their development. The 
argument usually comes with two corollaries: first, colonization 
benefited the colonies, and second, colonization burdened French 
taxpayers. This perspective on colonization was far from unanimous 
and passage of the law rekindled a raging public and academic debate. 
After several weeks of intense debate among academic historians and 
civil society, the controversial article of the law was repealed.
?The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 2014). © The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved.?doi: 10.1017/S0022050714000011.
Elise Huillery is Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints 
Pères, 75007 Paris, France. E-mail: elise.huillery@sciences-po.fr.  
I thank the editor Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, two anonymous referees, Jean-Marie Baland, 
Denis Cogneau, Frederic Cooper, Esther Duflo, Mamadou Diouf, Rui Estevez, Leigh Gardner, 
Kevin O’Rourke, Thomas Piketty, and Gilles Postel-Vinay for helpful comments, as well as 
numerous seminar audiences. I am grateful to the ACI “Histoire longue et répartition 
des ressources en Afrique” led by Denis Cogneau for funding and to Urbain Kouadio at the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France for administrative assistance extracting the colonial budgets. 
All errors are my own. 
1 Article 4: “Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de 
la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord.” 
O
2  Huillery
 This French political episode is part of a broader international debate 
on the costs and benefits of colonization. Britain by 1901 ruled a formal 
empire of 11.2 million square miles, with a population of almost 400 
million spread over the whole world (Foreman-Peck 1989), while some 
79 million people scattered over 4.6 million square miles were ruled  
by France (Fitzgerald 1988). The debate on the costs and benefits  
of colonization concerns both the colonizers and the colonies.  
On the colony side, colonization has been often viewed as a cause 
of the “African Tragedy” (Bairoch 1993), partly based on the idea  
that African underdevelopment is rooted in the imperial exploitation of 
the colonies. According to this view, colonization provided the 
possibility of economic exploitation because it created barriers to 
market entry, redistributed rights, and imposed obligations (see Ferro 
2003; Liauzu 2004; Bancel, Blanchard, and Lemaire 2005; Manceron 
2005 for the French colonization; for a broader discussion, see 
Foreman-Peck 1989). Moreover, recent research shows that colonial 
history had persistent effects on current development (Banerjee and  
Iyer 2005; Huillery 2009, 2011; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2008; Head, 
Mayer, and Ries 2010), suggesting that colonial economic features 
could explain a part of long-term African growth. On the other hand,  
the view that the colonies benefited from massive public and private 
investments made also good progress. Lance Davis and Robert 
Huttenbach (1986) depict British imperialism as a mechanism to create 
an income transfer from the tax paying middle class to the elites in 
which the ownership of imperial enterprise was heavily concentrated, 
with some slight net transfer to the colonies in the process. In their 
view, the main benefit for British colonies was related to state building 
and protection because the United Kingdom bore most of the defense 
costs of the British Empire. Jacques Marseille (1984) points to the  
fact that the colonies received substantial public subsidies from France. 
Marseille (1996), Daniel Lefeuvre (2005), François Bloch-Lainé (1956), 
and Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (1963) also support the idea that the 
metropolis funded large public investments in education, health, and 
infrastructure. Finally, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (1982) finds 
that France funded 13 percent of annual public investment in French 
West Africa from 1905 to 1937. The debate on the economic costs  
and benefits of colonization for the colonies thus oscillates between 
exploitation and paternalism, with unclear effects on postindependence 
African development.  
 On the colonizer side, colonization was unquestionably perceived  
as a political asset (so long as the country possessed a great overseas 
empire, France and Great Britain’s voice would continue to count for 
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something in world affairs), but the economic profitability for Great 
Britain and France is nothing less than controversial. Was colonization 
both politically and economically profitable? If not, what was the price 
to pay for the international status earned by the empire? In the 1970s 
most scholars claimed that the French and British economies benefited 
greatly from low cost imports and from protectionist commercial 
policies that provided markets for French and British exports (Edelstein 
1994; Arghiri 1969; Vanhaeverbeke 1970; Amin 1971, 1973). In the 
absence of the empire, the colonies could have placed higher tariffs  
on imperial exports, worsening British and French terms of trade and 
lowering British and French exports. Avner Offer (1993) also writes 
that British “investments in defense in empire secured sources of vital 
raw materials and manufactures during World War I, so that if there 
was any subsidy to the dominions, it was amply repaid.” Conversely, 
John Keynes believed British savings would have been better employed 
at home in creating jobs and modernizing the capital stock of the  
British economy (Moggridge 1992, p. 422). Marseille 1984, Davis and 
Huttenback 1986, Patrick O’Brien (1988), Edward Fitzgerald 1988,  
and Foreman-Peck 1989 followed this idea and provided evidence  
that colonization was costly to imperial economies. They made three 
arguments: first, public investments in the colonies were burdensome 
for French and British taxpayers;2 second, the mainland private sector 
suffered because some private investment was diverted towards the 
colonies and earned lower than expected returns; and third, colonial 
trade led to lower productivity gains due to a lack of competition and 
colonial protectionism (Marseille 1984; O’Brien 1988).
 Can it really be that the empire was economically bad for both  
the colonizers and her colonies? In the absence of a quantitative study 
like Davis and Huttenback’s, there is little hard evidence to support 
either of these views of French colonization. The question is vast, 
including economic aspects (costs and benefits from private and public 
investments and from colonial trade), political aspects (international 
voice, state building, legal system, institutions, and their quality) and 
demographic aspects (new diseases flows and men from the colonies 
serving in mainland army, among other issues).  
2 Davis and Huttenbach (1986) argue that British taxes would have been 20 percent less in the 
absence of empire because the United Kingdom bore most of the defense costs of the British 
Empire; Marseille (1984) estimates that the investment in public financial assets in the colonies 
amounted to 7 percent of metropolitan public expenditures in the 1910s, and 4 percent from 
1947 to 1958; Marseille (1996) estimates that the trade deficit compensated by France’s public 
subsidies to the colonies represented 8–9 percent of metropolitan expenditure in the 1920s and 
from 1945 to 1962. 
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 This article has a modest goal: I ask who paid for the public 
expenditures in French West Africa and also ascertain the extent to 
which French subsidies to West Africa weighted down mainland 
expenditures. To do this, I ignore the fact that tax revenue in both 
France and West Africa would have been different in the absence of 
colonization, because I lack the counterfactual situation in which France 
and West Africa would not have engaged into imperial relationships. 
The questions I address are: What share of French expenditure  
was allocated to West Africa? What share of West Africa’s revenue  
was provided by France? These two questions are crucial since scholars 
and politicians who claim colonization had a “positive role” make 
essentially the two arguments that the colonies benefited from imperial 
public investments and that mainland taxpayers sacrificed local 
investments for investments in the colonies. In the 1970s a team of 
economic historians supervised by Jean Bouvier and Catherine 
Coquery-Vidrovitch3 started collecting colonial budget data to answer 
these questions. François Bobrie and Coquery-Vidrovitch published 
some analysis of the financial transfers between the metropolis  
and the colonies, but unfortunately the analysis remained incomplete4
(Bobrie 1976; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1973, 1982). Jacques Marseille has 
been credited with finally ascertaining the cost of colonization for 
French taxpayers when he published his dissertation in 1984 (Marseille 
1984), but his analysis is based on indirect evidence on colonial trade 
deficits. 
 I compiled a new data set on the financial transfers between France 
(hereafter the metropolis) and one specific territory of the former 
French Empire, French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, 
thereafter AOF). The AOF was part of a vast empire5 that also included 
other colonies (Vietnam, Algeria, French Equatorial Africa,6 and 
Madagascar), protectorates (Tunisia, Morocco, Cambodia, and Laos), 
and mandates (part of Cameroon, part of Togo, Syria, and Lebanon). 
The AOF was a federation of eight colonies: Dahomey (now Bénin), 
Haute-Volta (Burkina-Faso), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée, Soudan français 
(Mali), Mauritanie, Niger, and Senegal. After few exploratory missions 
starting in 1844, the first French military push in West Africa began in 
1854 from the Senegalese coasts and arrived at the west side of current 
Mali in the late 1850s. Until 1880 colonial military campaigns were 
3 Recherche Coopérative sur Programme (RCP), CNRS, “Commerce, investissements et 
profits dans l’empire colonial français,” n°326, 1973–1979. 
4 Part of the collected data was lost while the university moved, especially data on French 
West Africa. 
5 I let aside the territories that remain French today, since colonization is still ongoing there. 
6 Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Tchad, and Centrafrique. 
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limited to coastal incursions in current Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea,  
and South Benin. The process amplified in the 1880s, leading to the 
official creation of French West Africa in 1895, although no drastic 
modifications for local people occurred before 1900–1910 except  
in few coastal localities. The federation abolished in 1960. I collected 
budgetary data from 1844 to 1957 at the colony, federation, and 
metropolis levels in order to get a comprehensive view of financial 
transfers in both directions—from Paris to Africa and from Africa  
to Paris. Obviously AOF is not representative of all French colonies. 
Nevertheless, this study is an important building block for any 
understanding of the French Empire. Colonization varied significantly 
from one territory to another within the French Empire since institutions 
and economic policies were fit to local conditions. For this reason,  
it seems crucial to differentiate the analysis by territory to paint  
an accurate picture of the cost of French colonization. For the former 
colonies, whose development paths since independence have differed 
significantly, it is also more informative to learn about each territory 
separately rather than as a whole.  
 This article thus attempts to clarify the debate on the cost of  
French colonization in the specific case of French West Africa. Unlike 
the existing literature, the article uses firsthand budgetary data covering 
the whole colonial period. I also distinguish subsidies (public aid)  
from loans (investments). That distinction, or rather the failure to make 
it is a major reason why the budgetary cost of colonization has been 
misinterpreted so far. Moreover, the article considers not only the 
transfers from Paris to Africa but also those from Africa to Paris which, 
when ignored, have led to an overestimation of France’s contribution  
to Africa’s revenue. The effort therefore provides a more reliable and 
comprehensive view on colonial public finance in French West Africa. 
 I find that the costs of AOF’s colonization for the metropolis were 
low. From 1844 to 1957 France devoted on average 0.29 percent of  
its public expenditures to AOF’s colonization. Colonization of French 
West Africa was profitable for France to the extent that the impact  
on cumulative domestic production exceeded 3.2 billion 1914 francs. 
The military cost of conquest and pacification accounts for the vast 
majority (80 percent) of the average annual cost. The cost of central 
administration in Paris accounts for another 4 percent. So subsidies  
to AOF account for only 16 percent of the average annual cost,  
meaning that less than 0.05 percent of annual total metropolis public 
expenditures were devoted to AOF’s development.7
7 In section 4, I discuss why military and central administration expenditures are not considered 
as contributions to AOF’s development.
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 For French West African taxpayers, French contribution was not  
as beneficial as has been argued. From 1907 to 19578 the metropolis 
provided about 2 percent of French West Africa’s public revenue.  
Local taxes thus accounted for nearly all of French West Africa’s 
revenue. These resources supported the cost of French civil servants 
whose salaries were disproportionally high compared to the limited 
financial capacity of the local population. Administrators, teachers, 
doctors, engineers, lawyers, and so on, were paid French salaries and 
got an additional allowance for being abroad. Thus, in the colonial 
public finance system, most revenues were collected on an African 
basis while being spent on a French basis. To illustrate this point,  
I show that colonial executives (eight governors and their cabinets) and 
district administrators (about 120 French civil servants) together 
accounted for more than 13 percent of local public expenditures. These 
findings imply that colonial public finances imposed a far larger black 
man’s burden than any white man’s burden.  
THE WELFARE EFFECT OF COLONIZATION ON TAXPAYERS 
 To start let us make the mechanisms through which colonization 
affected the welfare of taxpayers explicit.
 Taxpayers are assumed to value government spending equally to 
private consumption so public expenditure adds to private income  
in taxpayers’ disposable income. Moreover, taxation is assumed non- 
distortionary so domestic production ? does not depend on tax rate ?.
Taxpayers’ welfare ? is a strictly increasing function f of disposable 
income, which depends on domestic production ?, tax rate ?, and  
public expenditure ?? The economy is therefore defined by the triplet 
??? ?? ??:? ? ???? ? ??? ? ??.
 The counterfactual that I consider here is the absence of colonization. 
In the absence of colonization (hereafter, tilda refers to this 
counterfactual), public expenditures are simply equal to the tax revenue: 
?? ? ??? , thus the welfare of taxpayers depends only on domestic 
production:? ? ? ?????.
 Colonization leads the metropolis and the colony to increase their 
bilateral trade of goods and capitals, which has an impact on domestic 
production ?. It also leads to transfers of public resources between  
the metropolis and the colony. Let ?? denote public resources devoted  
8 This period of time is the largest one over which French West Africa’s revenue can be 
observed.
The Black Man’s Burden 7 
to the other economy, and ?? denote public resources received from the 
other economy. So in presence of colonization, public expenditures are 
defined by: ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? and ? ? ???? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ???.
Whether colonization increases the welfare of taxpayers is therefore 
simple to characterize:  
?? ? ?? ????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ???
But as long ??? ? is increasing that is equivalent to: 
?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??, or 
?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???
 Colonization improves welfare as long as the variation in domestic 
production due to colonial trade of goods and capitals is larger than the 
net public transfers from one economy to the other. This simple 
formalization of the problem leads to clear welfare effects on taxpayers: 
For an economy that receives transfers, colonization is beneficial for 
taxpayers as long as domestic production falls by less than the subsidy it 
receives. In contrast, for an economy that makes positive net transfer, 
colonization is beneficiary for taxpayers only if domestic production 
rises enough to compensate the subsidies.  
 The contribution of this article is to provide ?? and ?? for both the 
metropolis and French West Africa, thus providing a lower bound on the 
variation in domestic production that would make colonization beneficial 
for French and West African taxpayers: ?? ? ??. This work also finds ??
(tax revenue) in French West Africa, from which ? can be inferred using 
an estimation of the average tax rate.9 Data on ? in the metropolis is 
already available from French national accounts.  
 The remaining parameter ??  is the counterfactual domestic production in 
the absence of colonization. In contrast to the other parameters, it cannot 
be observed and its estimation would require building counterfactual 
French and West African economies without French colonial rule. For the 
French economy, colonization mainly affected the terms of trade and 
foreign investments. An estimation of ??  would thus require assessing 
how export and import prices varied due to the colonial rule, how much 
trade flows responded to this price variation, how much transaction costs 
decreased in the colonies compared to the rest of the world, how this 
decrease distorted foreign investments in favor of the colonies, and how 
9 Such an estimation is not an easy task, but I think that it would be feasible since the colonial 
budgets report the tax rate for each tax (or at least the main ones) in the economy. 
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the profitability of foreign investments in the colonies compared with 
foreign investments out of the colonies. In this article, I do not answer 
any of these questions so I cannot comment on the overall welfare effects 
of colonization for French taxpayers. For the West African economy, 
colonization not only affected the terms of trade and foreign investments, 
but more fundamentally the whole economic and political institutions. 
For this reason, I argue that an estimation of the counterfactual African 
domestic production might be out of reach. 
DATA 
 The original data sets used in this article and related documentation 
are available online at http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/elise-huillery (“Public 
Finance Data”). 
COLONIAL PUBLIC FINANCES IN AOF 
 Colonial public finances in AOF were based on three levels of 
budgets: metropolis, federation, and colony. Let us examine each in 
turn.
Metropolis Level 
 At the metropolis level, colonial expenses were part of the budget of 
the French Ministry of Colonies (before 1894 Ministry of Naval Forces 
and Colonies). Expenses incurred at the metropolis level are threefold: 
First, military expenses for colonial conquest and pacification: salaries, 
housing and transport, and military equipment. Second, administrative 
costs in the metropolis: the Ministry of Colonies, Geographical, 
Inspection, and Registration sections, communication costs (mail and 
telegraph), information campaigns (propaganda material), grants to 
emigrants to the colonies, grants to schools for colonial officials 
(ENFOM), and the cost of colonial exhibitions. Third, subsidies to 
AOF: subsidies to the federation government, public companies, and 
private companies.10
10 For instance, the private railway company La Société de Construction des Batignolles 
received subsidies from the metropolis to construct the line Dakar-Saint-Louis from 1882 to 1885. 
The metropolis budget continued to transfer resources to the company to fill the gap between 
running cost and revenue until 1928. The other railway lines (Thiès-Kayes-Koulikoro, Conakry-
Kankan, Abidjan-Ouagadougou, and Porto-Novo-Cotonou-Parakou) were constructed by public 
railway companies, in other words railway companies that were owned by the government.
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Federation Level 
 The federation received its revenues from federation taxes, mostly  
on trade, as well as transfers from the metropolis and colony budgets. 
Occasionally, the federation received short-term loans from the 
metropolis or from the loan budget (compare infra), which were 
reimbursed within the same financial year (or in the subsequent year in 
some cases). Federation expenses included the operating costs of the 
federation’s administration (personnel and capital), and some equipment  
expenses related to large-scale infrastructure like trans-colonial railways 
and seaports. The federation also provided some subsidies to the 
colonies (which were partly rebates on the customs revenue collected 
from each colony) as well as private companies and the metropolis. 
Finally, the federation had to service public loans.  
 Some auxiliary budgets supplemented the federation budget. First, 
there was the “loan budget” (compte de l’emprunt), whose revenue was 
based entirely on the disbursements of public loans. The AOF authorities 
contracted six loans in 1903, 1907, 1910, 1914, 1931, and 1932. These 
loans had to be approved by the French Parliament, because they were 
guaranteed by the French government. The majority of the funds were 
allocated to large-scale infrastructure projects and a smaller portion was 
invested in health and education. 
 Second, “special budgets” (budgets spéciaux) supported public 
companies working on large infrastructure projects such as railways,  
the port of Abidjan, the port of Dakar, and the port of Conakry. Their 
revenues came from the federation, the metropolis, allocations from 
loans, and the companies’ own revenues from operations. A few short-
term loans were also received from the metropolis and repayments were 
charged to the federation. So the only expenses supported by the special 
budgets were the operations of the companies.  
Colony Level 
 Colonies received revenue from local taxes, as well as transfers and 
cash advances from the federation. Colony budgets covered local colonial 
administration (government of the colony and administration of districts 
and subdivisions, judicial services, security services, and treasury 
services), public support for agricultural and industrial activities, 
and public investments in education, health, and infrastructure.  
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FIGURE 1
STRUCTURE OF COLONIAL PUBLIC FINANCES IN AOF 
Notes: The figure represents the flow of financial transfers among the different budgets.
Sources: Author’s computation from colonial budgets.
 Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the AOF’s public finance 
system and the flow of financial transfers among the different budgets. 
The organization of French colonial public funding largely reflects the 
fundamental principle adopted in the law of financial autonomy for the 
colonies (April 13th 1900). The main operating costs and equipment 
expenses in the colonies were supported by federation and colony 
budgets, with the metropolis providing subsidies when necessary.  
It was thought that the metropolis would provide temporary support 
until the federation could quickly reach financial autonomy.  
DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION 
 I collected data from all colonial budgets: metropolis, federation, 
loan, auxiliary, and colony budgets over the whole colonial period 
(1844–1957).11 Copies of these budgets are in the National Archives of 
11 The next subsection presents the detailed periods of data collection for each category of 
budget.
  Metropolitan Budget
 (Ministry of Colonies)
Loan Budgets
Local Budget Local Budget
Federal Budget
Special Budgets
(public companies)
Subsidy
Cash Advance
Loan
Cash Advance Repayment
Loan Repayment
Private Companies 
… etc.
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Senegal, Dakar, and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.  
In Dakar, access to budgets is easy, whereas in Paris it is more difficult 
because budgets are not publicly available when their physical 
condition has significantly deteriorated. To my knowledge, some 
volumes of the federation budgets can also be found at the Centre  
des Archives Economiques et Financières in Savigny-le-Temple.  
The documents are organized by budget year and category (metropolis, 
federation, loan, auxiliary and colony). For each year, two types of 
documents exist: first, a budget established before the beginning 
of the year reporting anticipated revenue and expenses; second, a final 
end-of-year account describing actual revenue and expenses.  
I used final accounts with actual revenue and expenses except when  
it was not available or did not include the variable of interest. Finally, 
data on total public expenditures in France come from the Annuaire 
Statistique de la France (1966). 
 Budget data were collected to cover the longest possible period of 
time. The first year of data collection varies by budget type following 
the development of colonial activities. I collect data beginning in 1844 
for France, 1898 for the special budgets, 1903 for the loan budget, and 
1907 for federation and colony budgets. Colonial budgets stopped in 
1957. Indeed, in 1958 the 5th Republic was established in France and 
the colonial empire’s status changed from “French Union” to “French 
Community.” The new regime gave autonomy to colonies which later 
became fully sovereign states governed by African leaders. Guinea 
decided to leave the French Community in 1958, as did Mali in 1959, 
and then the remaining colonies received independence in 1960. More 
practically, after 1958 each new state had an independent accounting 
system and the colonial administrations no longer collected or preserved 
budget data. After 1958 financial transfers from France to Africa were 
considered public aid rather than colonial funding. 
 The year-to-year differences in the organization of the budgets, and 
to a lesser extent, the differences in budgets between colonies, were a 
significant challenge. Very close attention was paid to construct variables 
that represented the same revenue and expenses over time and across 
territories12 (further documentation is available upon request).  
12 For instance, French expenditures for AOF were in the budget of the Ministère de la Marine in 
two subsections (“Service Colonial” and “Dépenses Faites à l’Extérieur”) from 1844 to 1862. In 
1863, the subsection “Service Colonial” was removed and the corresponding expenditures appear 
now in chapter V of the budget of the Ministère de la Marine. In 1884 French expenditures for 
AOF are no longer included in the budget of the Ministère de la Marine but in the budget of the 
Ministère des Colonies.
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 Nominal variables were inflation adjusted using a price consumption 
index from INSEE.13 The reference unit is 1914 francs which allows for 
comparison of results with the existing literature since most papers on 
the cost of colonization express values in 1914 francs.
Metropolis Budgets 
 The first Metropolis AOF-related expenses appear in 1844 when the 
French navy began to explore the West African coast. All years between 
1844 and 1957 are reported in the database except a handful of missing 
years (1858–1860, 1888, 1893, and 190514). Military expenses are also 
missing in 1940/41 and 1945 due to the difficulty of administrative 
supervision during World War II and 1955.15 To estimate the total 
transfers between AOF and the metropolis, I need to estimate France’s 
AOF-related expenses in these few missing years. I interpolated linearly 
between the two closest observed years: for instance, missing values in 
1888 are inferred to be the mean of 1887 and 1889 values. For each 
year, the database contains the following variables: First, total military 
expenses (for the whole French Empire), military expenses in AOF, and 
military expenses spent in some colonies but whose precise location 
could not be determined.16 Second, total civilian expenses (for the 
whole French Empire), expenses for running the central administration, 
civil expenses in AOF, and civil expenses spent in some colonies but 
whose precise location could not be determined. 
 The difficulty in computing the French military and civil expenses 
devoted to AOF colonization is that AOF colonization expenses are not 
always entirely observable in the Metropolis budget because the territory 
the money was spent in is not always clear. The budget specifies the 
precise location of most expenditure but not all of them. A share of these 
non-allocated expenses should be attributed to AOF. Furthermore, the 
cost of running the central administration includes the cost of all colonies 
and a share of it should be attributed to AOF as well. On average between 
1844 and 1957, 22 percent of French colonial expenses were not 
attributed to a specific colony.  
13 The consumer price index (CPI) used here is the official Insee-SGF consumer price index 
from Thomas Piketty (2011). 
14 For 1858–1860 the Ministry of Colonies was removed and merged with another ministry 
during these three years and the budgets could not be found. For 1881, 1893, and 1905, budgets 
exist but are not available at the BNF, Paris. 
15 The military section was not available at the BNF, Paris. 
16 Some budgets are more detailed than others regarding the geographical distribution of 
expenses across the colonies. Recent years are generally less detailed than the old ones. 
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 I use the share of allocated expenses attributed to AOF as a proxy 
for the share of non-allocated expenses attributed to AOF. Each year, 
I observe the value of colonial expenses specifically allocated to AOF 
and to the other territories. I thus observe the share of AOF in these 
allocated expenses. For some years, I can compute the share of AOF 
in civil and military allocated expenses separately. Otherwise I compute 
the share of AOF among total allocated expenses. I then attribute the 
same share of total non-allocated expenses (civil or military respectively) 
to AOF as the share of total allocated expenses (civil or military 
respectively). In this way, I assume that the distribution of non-allocated 
expenses follows the same pattern as the distribution of allocated 
expenses. Although not exact, it is the most reasonable assumption I can 
make.  
Federation Budgets 
 The AOF government was established in 1904 and its first budget 
in 1905. Budgets for all years between 1907 and 1957 were collected 
without missing data. However, the documents for the 1905 and 1906 
budgets could not be accessed because of their poor physical condition. 
Among the components of federation revenue, the database reports: 
Indirect taxes: trade taxes, tax on consumption, registration fees, and 
transaction fees; Receipts from public companies (mail, phone, telegraph, 
railways, ports, hospitals, and printing presses); Investment income: 
yields from capital investments, loan and cash advances reimbursements, 
and land revenue; Transfers from the metropolis: short-term loans and 
transfers; Total indirect taxes; Total revenue. 
 The database reports the following components of federation 
expenditures: Financial transfers to the metropolis: loans repayments, 
cash advances repayments and subsidies; Subsidies to colony budgets 
and private companies; Investment in infrastructure, education, health, 
security, justice and support to productive sectors; Operation costs of 
public companies (mail, phone, telegraph, hospital, printing works, 
railways, and ports); Running costs of the federation administration; 
Total expenditure. 
Special Budgets and Loan Budgets 
 Special budgets were collected from 1898 to 1957 (no missing years). 
The database reports the revenue of the special budgets by category: 
receipts from their own activities, short-term loans and transfers from 
the metropolis, and short-term loans and transfers from the federation. 
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The only expenses were the operation costs of the service (e.g., railway 
or port) so I did not report any specific category of expense in the 
database.  
 Loan budgets were collected from 1903 to 1957.17 Two missing years 
(1918 and 1938) were interpolated as the means of the neighboring years 
(1917–1919 and 1937–1939). The database reports all components of the 
revenue of loan budgets: loan disbursements from the metropolis, short-
term loans and transfers from the metropolis and from the federation 
budget. The database reports the following components of expenditures: 
investment in infrastructure, education, health, and subsidies to the 
private sector. 
Colony Budgets 
 Colony budgets were collected from 1907 to 1956 but not for all 
years. Since there were no direct transfers between France and 
individual colonies, colony budgets can be ignored to compute the  
net amount of money that was spent by the metropolis for AOF 
colonization. However, colony budgets matter to assessing whether the 
French transfers to AOF were significant in public resources in Africa. 
Indeed AOF public resources are the sum of federation and colony 
resources. Given this, the total revenue of each colony is my main 
variable of interest. I was able to collect such data for 25 years: 1907–
1920, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1943, 1946, 1949, 
1953, and 1956. I use linear inference to estimate the revenue in missing 
years (for instance, the colony revenue in 1921 and 1922 are estimated 
at the mean of colony revenue in 1920 and 1923).  
 Colony budgets provide revenue and expenditures information. 
Among the components of colony revenue, I collected all major direct 
taxes (personal taxes, value of mandatory service, income taxes, land 
taxes, residential taxes, taxes on trading licenses, taxes on cattle, and taxes 
on profits), total direct taxes, and total revenue. Among the components 
of colony expenses, I collected: administrative staff expenses, security 
staff expenses, education staff expenses, expenses for doctors and nurses, 
expenses for public works, indemnities to precolonial chiefs, and finally 
African chief salaries and bonuses. I also collected the number of African 
chiefs and the number of schools and pupils when available. 
17 These budgets should exist but are not available at the BNF, Paris. 
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Data on Transfers from the Metropolis to AOF 
 Annual transfers from the metropolis to AOF were constructed  
by combining data from two different sources. I use data from the 
metropolis budget for transfers before 1915, data from the federation 
budgets (including the special budget and loan budgets) for transfers 
between 1915 and 1949, and data from the metropolis budget for 
transfers after 1949.
 There are three reasons for using multiple data sources. First,  
prior to 1915, a large portion of the transfers from the metropolis to  
AOF consisted of subsidies to the Dakar-Saint Louis railway operator 
(La Société des Batignolles). Since these transfers were subsidies to a 
private firm, they did not appear on federation budgets. Subsidies to the 
Dakar-Saint-Louis railway operator stopped by 1915 and were replaced 
with short-term loans—at that point the federation budget becomes an 
accurate measure of transfers.  
 Second, the federation budgets are more precise than the metropolis 
budget. Indeed over time the French treasury produced national budgets 
that were less and less specific about where in the colonies it was 
spending money, especially after 1920. The federation budgets 
are, thus, generally more precise than the metropolis budget in later 
years.  
 However, after 1950 I return to using metropolis data since the 
federation accounts are incomplete. This is because the budget accounts 
of Fond d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social 
(FIDES) could not be located. FIDES was created in 1946 to finance  
a large portion of public investments in the colonies. The expenditures 
made by FIDES do not appear in AOF’s budgets since FIDES is an 
account in the Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Mer that appears 
only on the French budget. I located FIDES final accounts for 1947–
1949 but not for subsequent years. Therefore, despite the lack of detail 
on the geographical allocation of the metropolis contributions to 
FIDES, I use the French budgets after 1950 in order to include FIDES 
expenditures.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 As described in the previous section, transfers between the metropolis 
and AOF take various forms; so the obvious question is which transfers 
should enter into the calculation of ?? and ???
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FRENCH EXPENDITURES ON AOF VERSUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
AOF’S REVENUE 
 When analyzing monetary transfers between two entities, it is  
logical to assume symmetry: the amount transferred is equal to the 
amount received. This symmetry holds for AOF’s contributions to 
the metropolis’s budget: all expenditures made by AOF taxpayers for 
the metropolis are contributions to French revenue. But the reverse  
is not true: some French expenditure related to AOF’s colonization did 
not add up to AOF revenues. In particular, the military costs associated 
with conquest and pacification and operating costs of the central 
colonial administration in Paris were not included in AOF revenues. 
The question is whether these expenditures should be included in the 
total cost of running AOF.
Military Expenditures 
French military expenditures in the colonies consist primarily of 
personnel and material expenses associated with conquering the 
colonies. It includes the salary and operating expenses of French colonial 
headquarters in Paris, as well as wages and supplies for the troops, 
cost of the cavalry horses, army transportation costs, artillery, and soldier 
health care costs (including military hospitals in Paris). The military 
expenditures funded by the French Ministry of Colonies also include the 
cost of recruiting and transporting Senegalese Tirailleurs. From 1857 on 
the Senegalese Tirailleurs were recruited in the colonies (mostly in Sub-
Saharan Africa) and transported to other places where they served in the 
French army to help with the colonial conquest, World War I and II, and 
anti-French resistance wars in Indochina and Algeria. Many Senegalese 
Tirailleurs served in Europe, providing about 200,000 troops in World 
War I, which involved significant transportation costs. In his 1910 book 
“La force noire,” the French general Charles Mangin described his vision 
of a greatly expanded French colonial army thanks to the Senegalese 
Tirailleurs. The French socialist leader Jean Jaurès in “L’Armée 
Nouvelle” also advocated recruiting French soldiers in the colonies due to 
the declining birthrate in the metropolis.  
 Should these expenditures be included in the cost of running 
the colony? From the French point of view these costs should be 
included. In the absence of colonization, none of these costs would 
have been incurred by French taxpayers. However, a fraction of the 
military expenditures, specifically the cost of recruiting and transporting 
Senegalese Tirailleurs to reinforce the French army, is not related 
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to the cost of AOF’s colonization but rather to the cost of securing 
French territories. Since data in the budget only provides aggregate 
military expenditures for AOF, I cannot disentangle between the cost of 
the colonial conquest and the cost of reinforcing the French army for 
French defense. Both are included in the account of military expenditures 
for AOF in my analysis, leading to an overestimation of the cost of 
AOF’s colonization.
 From AOF’s point of view, the question is whether AOF’s taxpayers 
would have incurred the same expenses in the absence of colonization. 
The answer is clearly no. Without colonization, there would not have 
been any military cost of conquest or pacification. It is important to note 
that military costs supported by the French Ministry of Colonies do not 
include the costs of local defense and the establishment of a state. These 
costs were borne by the AOF. Federation and colony budgets include  
a defense and security section that covers the expenditures related to 
police and military forces used to maintain peace and order within the 
AOF. Therefore, the French contribution to AOF revenues should not 
include any French military expenditure.  
Expenditures for Central Colonial Administration 
The metropolis budget also funded the central colonial administration. 
This includes the personnel and operating costs incurred in mainland 
France associated with managing the colonies: the Ministry of Colonies, 
the Colonial School (Ecole Coloniale), the Colonial Garden (now called 
Jardin Tropical de Paris), colonial inspections, the agency tasked with 
colonial propaganda (Agence Générale des Colonies), communication 
between the metropolis and the colonies, and the two colonial exhibitions 
held in Paris in 1907 and 1931.  
 From the French point of view, these costs should definitely be 
included in the cost of colonization. From the AOF’s point of view, 
the question is again whether AOF’s taxpayers would have incurred the 
same expenses in the absence of colonization. Some expenses related to 
running the central administration in Paris would have had to be incurred 
by West African governments, such as the cost of a colonial school 
to train administrators, or perhaps even the cost of a colonial garden 
to experiment with new crop varieties. But the Ministry of the Colonies 
would not have existed in an independent state: AOF was equipped with 
an adequate administration including a central government, colonies’ 
governments, districts’ administrators, subdistricts administrators, 
and finally indigenous chiefs serving as tax collectors. The Ministry of 
Colonies in Paris was an additional administrative level the metropolis 
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needed to coordinate colonial activities and decisions over all territories, 
which would have been useless in the absence of colonization. 
The same applies to the communication costs between the metropolis and 
the colonies, the cost of colonial inspections,18 the cost of the colonial 
propaganda agency, and the cost of colonial exhibitions. Thus, in the 
absence of colonization, a West African government would have avoided 
a large proportion of central colonial expenditures. Consequently, an 
estimate of France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue should exclude 
central administration expenditures. Alternatively, if expenditures 
in Paris would have been made by an independent AOF (like the colonial 
school or the colonial garden), they should be included in the estimate. 
The former provides a lower-bound estimate, while the latter provides an 
upper-bound estimate of France’ contribution to AOF’s revenue. 
 To conclude, all expenditures incurred by the metropolis for AOF’s 
colonization are not contributions to AOF’s revenue. This asymmetry 
reflects the fact that colonization itself is asymmetric: one economy 
dominates the other, both politically and institutionally. The cost of this 
domination is reflected in the cost of military conquest and central 
colonial administration.  
TRANSFERS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Both the metropolis and AOF subsidized private companies in  
the colonies. These transfers were intended to help private firms start 
income generating activities in AOF. It is not clear how these subsidies 
should be treated within the framework. In the absence of these 
subsidies, AOF taxpayers might have had to cover the cost of these 
private companies (increasing AOF expenditures by the same amount  
as the size of the transfers). Under this case, French subsidies to private 
colonial companies should be included in the France’s contribution  
to AOF development. Another possible counterfactual is that the 
beneficiaries of these subsidies were French business owners. Under 
this view, the subsidies were essentially transfers from French taxpayers 
to French business owners and should not be included in France’s 
contributions to AOF’s development.  
 In the AOF, French subsidies to the private sector all went to one 
private company: a subsidiary of La Société de Construction des 
Batignolles. La Société de Construction des Batignolles built and 
operated the Dakar-Saint-Louis railway line. The metropolis provided  
a large initial subsidy in 1884, when construction began, followed by 
18 The inspections at the metropolis level were in additional to inspections at the federation 
and colony level. 
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smaller annual subsidies until 1914. Railway construction is a classic 
example of market failure in which high fixed costs discourage private 
investors to enter the market. Thus, I assume French support for Société 
des Batignolles was a substitute for AOF public support rather than 
transfers to private French business owners. In other words, in the 
absence of colonization, AOF taxpayers would have supported the 
construction of the railway because it would not have been constructed 
by unsubsidized private firms due to market failure. As a consequence, 
French support to the Société des Batignolles should be included 
in France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue.  
AOF’S PUBLIC LOANS 
 The AOF received loans from a public bank (La Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations) supplemented by private banks, mainly Crédit Lyonnais, 
Société Générale, and Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Messmer 
1939). These loans required approval by the French Parliament and 
Senate and were guaranteed by the French government. If AOF 
defaulted on this debt, the loans would have been repaid from the 
French budget and thus would be a cost borne by French taxpayers.  
If properly repaid, there was no cost for French taxpayers.
 A total of 2.096 billion in public debt was approved for AOF  
(65 million in 1903, 100 million in 1907, 14 million in 1910, 167 
million in 1913, 1,690 million in 1931, and 60 million in 1932). Among 
this, 1,014 million was actually disbursed from 1903 to 1937. The loans 
were systematically repaid as shown in the federation budget, for a total 
repayment of 1.404 billion. AOF’s public loans did not affect French 
resources since AOF did not default on any of its loans.
 What were the benefits for AOF? By securing AOF’s debt, the 
metropolis allowed AOF to borrow at relatively low rates. Even though 
AOF’s loans did not have any cost for French taxpayers, the metropolis 
implicitly reduced interest payments incurred by AOF. I assume that 
AOF would have contracted these loans in the absence of colonization. 
The implicit contribution to AOF’s revenue is therefore the difference 
between interest payments that AOF would have been charged if the 
debt had not been secured by the metropolis and the actual interest 
payments.  
 On the other hand, when approving these loans, the French Parliament 
included a clause stating that public works funded by the loans must use 
French materials, as well as French shipping companies to transport the 
materials to AOF. Auguste Dardenne (1908) examines the additional cost 
this clause imposes on the colonies. For instance in Indochina, the author 
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finds costs increase by 15 percent due to this clause. This additional 
cost imposed should be subtracted from the implicit French contribution 
to AOF’s revenue due to the better loan terms.  
 Loans made to AOF likely came with both a benefit and a cost:  
there were smaller interest payments, but also larger material costs.  
It would be difficult to estimate the loan terms AOF would have been 
offered in the absence of backing by the metropolis, and at what price 
AOF would have bought public work materials in the absence of the 
clause. Such estimates are beyond the scope of this article which 
focuses on calculating the actual financial transfers between France  
and AOF. I thus don’t include these implicit benefit and cost in  
the France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue (which is equivalent to 
assuming that they offset one another perfectly).  
ESTIMATES OF INTEREST 
 Following the discussion of various transfers between AOF and the 
metropolis, I propose to estimate the cost of AOF’s colonization for 
French taxpayers as follows:  
Cost of 
AOF for 
French 
Taxpayers 
= Cost of 
Conquest 
+ Cost of 
Central
Administration
+ Subsidies 
to Private 
Companies
Operating 
in AOF 
+ Transfer 
from the 
Metropolis
to AOF 
– Transfers 
from AOF 
to the 
Metropolis
As for France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue, I propose two estimates. 
The first estimate, hereafter the lower-bound estimate, does not include 
the expenditures for central administration among the expenditures that 
AOF would have had to support in the absence of colonization:  
Frances’ Contribution 
to AOF’s Revenues 
(lower bound)  
= Subsidies to Private 
Companies Operating 
in AOF 
+ Transfer from 
the Metropolis to 
AOF 
– Transfers 
from AOF to 
the Metropolis 
The second estimate, thereafter the upper-bound estimate, includes the 
expenditures for central administration among the expenditures 
that AOF would have had to support in the absence of colonization:
Frances’ 
Contribution 
to AOF’s 
Revenues 
(upper 
bound)  
= Cost of 
Central 
Administration 
+ Subsidies 
to Private 
Companies 
Operating in 
AOF 
+ Transfer 
from the 
Metropolis to 
AOF 
– Transfers from 
AOF to the 
Metropolis 
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THE COST OF AOF COLONIZATION FOR FRENCH TAXPAYERS 
Transfers Between France and AOF 
 Let us start with transfers from AOF to the metropolis. These 
appeared exclusively on the federation budget. The objective of these 
transfers was to reimburse the metropolis for expenses related to 
AOF’s colonization, namely the cost of military conquest and  
of central colonial administration. After 1945 AOF’s transfers to  
the metropolis also funded French reconstruction and various new 
French organizations such as ORSTOM (a research agency focused  
on development issues) or the Cité Universitaire Internationale in Paris  
(a university in Paris hosting foreign students). 
 Data on the federation expenses is available beginning in 1907 and I 
assume that there were no transfers from AOF to the metropolis before 
that. However, it is likely that AOF started to reimburse the 1903 public 
loan before 1907. In this case, the assumption that there were no transfers 
from AOF to the metropolis before 1907 leads to an overestimation of the 
cost of AOF’s colonization and of France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue 
(although I miss only maximum three repayments—1904, 1905, and 
1906—so the resulting bias would be very small). From 1907 to 1957 
total AOF transfers to France amounted to 198.3 million (1914 francs). 
Figure 2 shows that AOF’s contribution to French expenditures increased 
substantially during the two world wars, as the colonies provided soldiers 
to help the French army as well as financial resources to cover war 
expenses. It also shows a sizeable increase after World War II, which 
reflects the cost of French reconstruction funded by AOF.  
 Let us now turn to French expenditures for AOF’s colonization.  
It encompasses subsidies to AOF (including subsidies to private 
companies operating in AOF), military expenditures (not only for 
AOF’s conquest but also for recruitment of the Senegalese Tirailleurs 
who served in the French army), and AOF’s share in the expenditure for 
the central colonial administration in Paris. Subsidies from AOF to the 
metropolis are substracted so as to compute the net transfers from the 
metropolis to AOF. Figure 3 shows the size and evolution of the net 
expenditures for AOF over the colonial period. The immediate 
striking fact is that France’s expenditure for AOF has been mainly 
concentrated after 1941 with net expenditure from 1941 to 1957 
accounting for 90 percent of all net expenditure to AOF during the 
colonial period.
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FIGURE 2
AOF TRANSFERS TO THE METROPOLIS, 1907–1957 
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts and budgets.
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts and budgets.
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FRENCH NET EXPENDITURES ON AOF, 1844–1957 
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 Because of the disproportionate concentration of expenditure for 
AOF after 1941, we have to zoom in subperiods in order to better 
observe the evolution and composition of French expenditure for AOF. 
Figure 4A zooms in 1844–1899, a period starting with the colonial 
conquest and ending with financial autonomy laws of the colonies. 
During this period, the expenditure for the central administration is 
nonexistent before the creation of the Ministry of the Colonies in 1884, 
and remains very low even after its creation. Subsidies to AOF are 
slightly positive but also almost nonexistent during this period, except 
the big subsidy in 1884 and 1885 to La Société de Batignolles to build 
the Dakar-Saint Louis railway. Military expenses thus represent almost 
all French expenditure for AOF and increased rapidly in 1882 reflecting 
the increased importance of colonial conquests—a period often referred 
to as the “Scramble for Africa.” 
 Examining the period 1900 to 1940 (Figure 4B) shows that from its 
creation until 1940, AOF’s subsidies to the metropolis exceeded French 
subsidies to AOF, reflecting not only the financial autonomy laws of  
the colonies but also the need for the colonies to contribute to central 
expenditures. The cost of the central colonial administration remained 
as inexistent during this second period as during the first period. 
Military expenditure is therefore the only cost of AOF from 1900 to 
1940. A part of the military expenditure covered the cost of pacifying 
some resistant areas in AOF (mainly in Mauritania, north Mali, and 
Niger). Another part of the military expenditure was for the recruitment 
and transportation of the Senegalese Tirailleurs to help the French army 
with the conquest and pacification of other territories, as well as with 
national defense during World War I as reflected by the sharp increase 
in military expenditures during World War I (especially 1915–1918).  
It is also worthy to note that the Senegalese Tirailleurs received a 
pension after World War I, which participates to the fact that military 
expenditure remained substantial in the 1920s and 1930s.
 Finally, the period 1941 to 1957 (Figure 4C) shows that late 
colonization was very different from the previous colonization, not only 
because of the dramatic rise in French expenditures for AOF, but also 
because of the change in the composition of French expenditure. 
Military expenditures increased during World War II (mostly 1940–
1942) due to the recruitment and transportation of the Senegalese 
Tirailleurs to supplement the French army. It remained high (and briefly 
increased) after 1946 due to payment of the Senegalese Tirailleurs’ 
pensions and the cost of Senegalese Tirailleurs fighting to suppress  
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FIGURE 4B
FRENCH NET EXPENDITURES ON AOF, 1900–1940
FIGURE 4C
FRENCH NET EXPENDITURES ON AOF, 1941–1957 
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts and budgets.
FIGURE 4A
FRENCH NET EXPENDITURES ON AOF, 1844–1899
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independence movements in Indochina and Algeria. Military 
expenditure no longer totalizes French expenditure for AOF: The 
cost of central administration exploded at the end of the colonial period  
due to the decision to transfer the personnel expenses for colonies  
and districts administrators (French civil servants) from colony and 
federation budgets to metropolis budget in 1955. This reform was meant 
to encourage the inclusion of Africans in the colonial administration. 
Moreover, France eventually granted AOF with large subsidies: In 1941 
the metropolis created the Fonds de Solidarité Coloniale supplemented, 
followed in 1946 by the Fond d’Investissement pour le Développement 
Economique et Social (FIDES), to finance large infrastructure and 
equipment investments in the colonies. 
 Overall from 1844 to 1957, military expenditures amounted to  
2.211 billion (1914 francs), expenditures for the central colonial 
administration amount to 247.31 million (1914 francs), and net 
subsidies to AOF amounted to 750.46 million (1914 francs). Military 
expenditures thus account for 69 percent of total charges related to AOF 
colonization, while net subsidies to AOF account for 23 percent and the 
expenditures for central administration account for only 8 percent. 
HOW BURDENSOME WAS AOF FOR FRENCH TAXPAYERS? 
 Table 1 presents the average annual cost of AOF’s colonization  
for French taxpayers, expressed as the share of France’s public 
expenditures. The average annual share was 0.29 percent of metropolis 
expenditures—military expenditures amounted to less than 0.24 
percent, transfers to AOF to less than 0.05 percent, and central colonial 
administration not even 0.01 percent (Table 2, panel A). The share of 
metropolis expenditures absorbed by the military expenditures and the 
central administration of AOF remained almost stable over the entire 
colonial period. However, the share devoted to AOF’s development 
(transfers to AOF) varied dramatically before and after 1945, from an 
annual average of 0.02 percent to an annual average of 0.24 percent 
(Table 2, panels B and C).
 Figure 5 details the evolution of the annual share of metropolis  
public expenditures devoted to AOF from 1844 to 1957. The most 
costly year of AOF’s colonization was 1949 with 1.4 percent of 
metropolitan expenditures devoted to AOF. This year included a large 
investment in the Senegalese Tirailleurs for the French army and a 
large subsidy to FIDES. AOF was also costly for French taxpayers 
in 1955, 1956, and 1957 due to large contributions to FIDES 
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TABLE 1
COST OF AOF COLONIZATION FOR FRENCH TAXPAYERS, 1844–1957 
Cost of AOF Colonization 
1914 Francs 
(millions) 
Average Share of Metropolis 
Expenditure 
(percentage points) 
No. of 
Years 
Mean Std. Dev.   Min   Max 
Panel A: Total colonial period 
Total, among which: 3,208.81 0.29 0.21 0.04 1.40 114 
Military Expenses for AOF 2,211.04 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.71 114 
Central Administration for 
AOF    247.31 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.25 114 
Subsidies to AOF    750.46 0.05 0.12 –0.07 0.67 114 
Panel B: 1844–1945 
Total, among which: 1,566.15 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.63 102 
Military Expenses for AOF 1,450.41 0.22 0.11 0.04 0.57 102 
Central Administration for 
AOF      40.91 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 102 
Subsidies to AOF      74.83 0.02 0.05 –0.07 0.36 102 
Panel C: 1946–1957 
Total, among which: 1,642.65 0.66 0.35 0.20 1.40 12 
Military Expenses for AOF    760.63 0.36 0.17 0.20 0.71 12 
Central Administration for 
AOF    206.39 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.25 12 
Subsidies to AOF    675.63 0.24 0.28 –0.06 0.67 12 
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts and budgets.
exceeding 0.5 percent of total metropolis expenditures. Finally, 
French taxpayers devoted about 0.3 percent–0.4 percent of metropolis 
expenditures to AOF from 1884 to 1885 for the construction of  
the Dakar-Saint-Louis railway and about 0.5 percent of metropolis 
expenditures in the 1890s for initial colonial conquest. For the 
remaining periods, the cost of AOF remained small and investments in 
AOF’s development almost nonexistent. All in all, AOF’s development 
was far from burdensome for French taxpayers. 
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FIGURE 5
Sources: Author’s calculations from metropolitan and colonial final accounts.
THE BENEFIT OF COLONIZATION FOR WEST AFRICANS 
TAXPAYERS
 To what extent did France contribute to AOF’s revenue and alleviate 
West Africans’ tax burden. The consensus in France is that the 
metropolis financed a majority of public investment in the colonies. 
Even if AOF’s development was not burdensome for French taxpayers, 
it is still possible that France’s contribution accounted for a large 
portion of local investment. 
AOF’S REVENUE PROVIDED BY THE METROPOLIS 
 AOF’s total annual revenues are calculated by summing the revenues 
for colony, federation, loan, and auxiliary budgets. We can do so 
starting in 1907, when the colonial administration began to produce 
comprehensive public accounts at both federation and colony levels.19
19 Data from colony budgets are collected for 25 years over 1907–1957. A linear trend assumption 
is made to infer the value of total colony revenue for missing years.
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TABLE 2 
FRANCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO AOF’S REVENUE, 1907–1957 
Average France’s Contribution to AOF’s Revenue  
(percentage points) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Years 
Panel A: Total Colonial Period 
Lower-bound estimate   1.39 5.43 –4.63 19.56 51 
Upper-bound estimate   2.32 6.25 –4.63 25.29 51 
Panel B: 1907–1945 
Lower-bound estimate –0.26 2.87 –4.63 12.74 39 
Upper-bound estimate   0.47 2.71 –4.63 13.84 39 
Panel C: 1946–1957 
Lower-bound estimate   6.75 8.02 –2.01 19.56 12 
Upper-bound estimate   8.35 9.76 –1.64 25.29 12 
Note: In this table, the lower-bound estimate of France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue reports 
metropolitan net subsidies to AOF divided by AOF’s total revenue. The upper-bound estimate 
of France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue reports the sum of metropolitan net subsidies to AOF 
and metropolitan expenditures for central administration divided by the sum of AOF’s total 
revenue and metropolitan expenditures for central administration. It assumes that AOF would 
have paid for these expenses would the metropole not have paid for it. 
Sources: Author’s calculations from metropolitan and colonial final accounts.
The Appendix presents descriptive statistics for AOF’s total revenue. 
France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue is thus observed from 1907 to 
1957.
 Table 2 presents the average annual French contribution to AOF 
revenue from 1907 to 1957 under two counterfactuals giving a lower-
bound and an upper-bound estimate of France’s contribution. Over the 
whole colonial period, the annual French contribution ranges from 1.39 
percent to 2.32 percent of AOF’s annual revenue, meaning that West 
Africans did not depend on the metropolis to run the colonies and finance 
public investments (Table 2, panel A). As shown in panels B and C, 
the picture is very different before and after 1945. Before 1945 the 
average French contribution is almost zero, whereas after 1945 it is 
above 7 percent of AOF revenues. In the later colonial period, France’s 
contribution became substantial, suggesting that the increase in resources 
provided to FIDES was more pronounced than the concurrent growth of 
local resources.  
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Sources: Author’s calculations.
 Figure 6 details the evolution of the share of AOF annual revenue 
provided by the metropolis from 1907 to 1957. The first striking fact  
is that AOF was a contributor to France’s revenue more often than  
a beneficiary: 57 percent of time (29 years from 1907 to 1957), AOF 
did not receive any contribution from France but rather contributed 
to France’s revenue. In 1944 AOF devoted 4.63 percent of its revenue 
to the metropolis, while France’s maximum donation to AOF never 
exceeded 1.4 percent of its revenue. Second, we see that the French 
contribution was exceptionally high in five years: 1941 (creation of the 
Fonds de Solidarité Coloniale), 1949 (FIDES’s first plan), and 1955 to 
1957 (FIDES’s second plan). Over these five years, AOF received 
between 12 percent and 25 percent of its revenue from the Metropolis,  
a huge windfall for AOF. The rest of the time, France’s contribution 
remained small, even negative. All in all, local taxes provided the vast 
majority—about 98 percent—of AOF’s revenue.  
THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN: THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION 
 Examining AOF’s expenditures reveals that the cost of running the 
colony was most likely considerably different from what it would have 
been in the absence of colonization. AOF’s budget supported very high 
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expenses on the French civil servants who ran the AOF’s administration 
and public services. On top of their usual French salary, French civil 
servants working in AOF received a significant expatriation premium: 
for instance, the salary of a French administrator (1st rank) in 1910  
was 14,000 francs a year with an additional expatriation premium 
amounting to 4,000 francs a year. So the total cost of a French 
administrator (1st rank) was 18,000 francs a year. At this time, West 
Africans paid a poll tax of three francs per year. This means that in  
a typical district where a population of 100,000 inhabitants, among 
which only individuals aged 10 and higher paid a poll tax, a total  
of 6,000 taxpayers were needed to cover the salary of a single French 
administrator. The cost of French civil servants seems out of proportion 
with the capacity of local taxpayers.  
 How much less would an independent state have cost? The answer to 
this question is difficult but budgets give some idea: the basic salary of 
a French teacher was 6,000 francs a year while the salary of an African 
instructor was 600 francs a year. Therefore, one French teacher costs  
as much as ten African teachers. Given that France’s contribution  
to AOF’s revenue was small, the colonial public finance system had  
the strange feature that revenue was driven by local capacity while 
expenditures were driven by French standards.
 As a consequence, limited funds were left for public investments. 
Figure 7 reports the share of colony expenditures devoted to French 
officials in the colonies: the personnel and material expenditures  
of the colony governors and their cabinets and the salaries of 
French administrators at the district level. AOF encompasses about 120 
districts over eight colonies. The government officials that I consider in  
Figure 7 represent less than 130 individuals. For comparison purpose, 
Figure 7 also reports the share of colony total expenditures devoted  
to education and health (total personnel and materials). On average, 
over the 25 observed years between 1907 and 1957, the expenses 
devoted to 130 French officials represented 13.5 percent of AOF’s 
total expenditures, while education and health together represented 
only 11.7 percent of AOF’s total expenditures. After 1949 the salaries 
of top officials were funded through the national budget, explaining the 
decrease in the share of total expenditures devoted to French officials. 
The cumulative cost of French officials over 25 years20 amounted to 
169.4 million 1914 francs, representing 23 percent of total metropolis 
transfers to AOF over 112 years.21 To conclude, AOF’s taxpayers  
20 The 25 observed years from 1907 to 1957. 
21 From 1844 to 1957. 
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FIGURE 7
SHARE OF AOF EXPENDITURE FOR TOP-130 FRENCH OFFICIALS AND FOR 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH, 1907–1957 
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts and budgets.
received only limited benefits from the metropolis but they bore the 
large cost of French administration.  
 Despite the fact that the burden of the French administration  
reduced AOF’s capacity to invest in public services, AOF might have 
experienced some benefits. First, the difference in productivity between 
French civil servants and African officers may have justified the 
difference in salaries. Second, the high salaries paid to French officers 
might have benefited local population through local consumption. 
However, it seems unlikely that French teachers were ten times 
more efficient than African teachers, especially since non-native 
French-speakers may have had difficulty learning from French 
teachers. It may also be the case that French civil servants in the 
colonies consumed goods in France rather than spend their salaries in 
AOF. 
 In French West Africa, colonization was cheap for France and 
France’s contribution to the colonies’ development was very small until 
just before independence. These results are at odds with much of the 
leading literature which emphasizes colonization as a financial burden.  
This section aims to present the results of previous studies on the cost of 
colonization for French taxpayers, and to discuss the reasons why these 
results may differ and are generally less reliable than the results of this 
study.
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EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES WITH THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
 This article finds that on average 0.29 percent of annual metropolis 
expenditures were spent on the AOF and that France provided on 
average about 2 percent of AOF’s annual revenue. In the absence  
of similar studies on other colonies, it is not possible to know if this  
is representative of other French colonies. If in fact AOF was 
representative of the other colonies, colonization should have absorbed 
1.6 percent of French annual expenditure, which is far below the 
estimates provided by Bobrie (1976) and Marseille (1984, 1996). 
My estimate uses the fact that the AOF’s received 18 percent on 
average of the Ministry of Colonies’ expenditures over 1844–1957.  
Our findings suggest that colonization was much cheaper for French 
taxpayers and that France’s contribution to colonies’ development  
was much smaller than what was found in previous studies. These 
differences can be explained in five ways.  
 First, AOF might not be representative of the other colonies. AOF 
accounted for 18 percent of the expenditures of the Ministry of Colonies 
but it is possible that contributions from the colonies to the metropolis 
were larger from AOF than from the other colonies, resulting in  
a higher share in the metropolis budget. France’s contribution to 
colonies’ revenue might also have been larger in the other colonies, 
especially in French Equatorial Africa and Algeria which had a 
reputation for being the most costly colonies.
 A second reason for the differences may be the study time period. 
The previous studies do not cover the whole colonial period: Bobrie 
(1976) covers 1850–1913, Coquery-Vidrovitch (1982) covers 1905–
1937, while Marseille (1984, 1996) mainly focuses on the 1950s.  
As observed in our figures, the share of metropolis expenditures 
devoted to AOF and France’s contribution to AOF’s revenue varied 
greatly over time, suggesting that studies should consider the whole 
colonial period to draw general conclusions about the cost and benefit 
of colonization.
 Third, Bobrie (1976) and Marseille (1984, 1996) do not take  
into account transfers from the colonies to France, resulting in an 
overestimation of the burden of the colonies for French taxpayers.  
In this article, I observe transfers from the metropolis to AOF as well  
as transfers from AOF to the metropolis in order to give an accurate 
estimate of the effective share of AOF in metropolis expenditures. 
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 Fourth, Coquery-Vidrovitch (1982) and Marseille (1984, 1996) have  
a different treatment of colonies’ public loans. Marseille (1984, 
1996) include public loans as part of the cost of colonization for French 
taxpayers, ignoring the fact that a loan is not a cost but an investment  
if it is properly repaid. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1982) includes public loan 
disbursements, net of colonies’ repayments, in France’s contribution  
to local public investments. However, she observes disbursements 
and repayments only until 1937, when AOF’s public loans were all 
disbursed but not yet repaid, which results in an overestimation of 
France’s contribution. Since I observe the repayments until 1957, I take 
advantage of the fact that repayments were all made in due time and 
that the French government never had to support AOF’s repayments. 
This way, I exclude public loans from France’s contribution to AOF’s 
revenue and avoid the issue with the difference in schedules between 
loans’ disbursement and repayment.  
 Finally, Marseille’s result is based on the assumption that colonies’ 
trade deficits were financed by metropolis transfers. However, there is no 
evidence that the colonies’ trade deficits were balanced by metropolis 
transfers: they could have been balanced by private investments from 
French entrepreneurs or lenders, which would have been a source of 
income for French investors rather than a cost for French taxpayers.22
Alternatively, borrowed fund from local banks, which would have 
required local savings, could have been used to pay for imports in the 
colonies. I do not have data on private savings during colonial times in 
AOF, but I do have data on public savings from final accounts data 
(subtracting total expenditures from total revenues). Figure 8 shows public 
savings at the federation level by year from 1907 to 1957. The total 
public savings in AOF from 1907 to 1957 is 941.6 million (1914 francs). 
The total trade gaps in AOF from 1907 to 1957 amount to 2,309.1 million 
(1914 francs). AOF public savings therefore accounts for 41 percent of 
AOF trade gaps. The possibility that African companies could borrow 
money from local banks to pay for imports is worth considering 
given that data shows that AOF trade gaps vis-à-vis the metropolis were 
not compensated by French transfers. Marseille’s interpretation of trade 
deficits is therefore misleading.
22 According to the estimated returns to investment in Coquery-Vidrovitch (1973) and Marseille 
(1984), colonial private investment was often very profitable.
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Sources: Author’s calculations.
CONCLUSION 
Using original data from colonial budgets, I show that French  
West Africa did not place a significant economic burden on French 
taxpayers. France devoted on average 0.29 percent of its annual  
public expenditures to AOF, among which 80 percent was for military 
expenditures for colonial conquest and the Senegalese Tirailleurs.  
Only 16 percent of annual French expenditures for AOF were transfers 
to AOF, and the remaining 4 percent went to paying for the central 
colonial administration in Paris. In contrast to the consensus in the prior 
literature, AOF was far from an economic black hole. Secondly, many 
Africans believe they owe French colonizers for their schools, hospitals, 
roads, harbors, railways, and various other infrastructures. Yet they 
financed 98 percent of the cost of running and developing French West 
Africa with their own resources. Finally, West Africans supported the 
high cost of French administrators whose salaries were disproportionate 
in comparison to local tax capacity. Colonization was therefore more of 
a black man’s burden than a white man’s burden.  
 The next step is to assess whether this result holds for the other 
French colonies in order to provide evidence on the total cost of 
colonization for French taxpayers as well as Indochina’s, Algeria’s, 
Equatorial Africa’s, and Madagascar’s taxpayers. We would then like  
to go a step further and estimate the impact of colonization on French 
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domestic production to assess the net profitability of colonization for 
France. The broader question of whether colonization was economically 
bad for both the colonizer and her colonies is still open, but the modest 
contribution of France to West Africa’s development suggests that it 
should not have been really bad for France, whereas it could have been 
so for West Africa. In other words, our findings make unlikely that 
colonization of West Africa dampened French growth in a serious way, 
while it leaves large room for the hypothesis that it caused persistent 
damage on the West African economy. This article reinvigorates an 
important debate on colonial history with the hope of renewing this area 
of research.
Appendix: Descriptive Statistics on AOF Total
Tax Revenue 
At the federation level, most revenue came from trade taxes (68 percent on 
average over 1907–1957). Nine percent came from income generated by the federal 
government (receipts from public companies and financial yields). Nine percent came 
from French short-term loans and transfers. Revenue for the loan budget came from 
loan disbursements from the metropolis (64 percent of total revenue over 1903–1957), 
while the 36 percent left came from short-term loans and transfers from the metropolis 
and the federation budget. A majority of the revenue for auxiliary budgets 
came from receipts from their own activities (92 percent of total revenue over 1898–
1957), while the remaining 8 percent was made up of short-term loans and transfers 
from the metropolis and the federation budget.  
 At the colony level, most revenue came from direct taxes (54 percent on average 
over 1907–1957). The remainder of revenue came from indirect taxes and transfers 
from the Federation budget. Most direct taxes were on individuals including capitation 
taxes, “prestations” (coerced labor which was mandatory for all individual above 
age 8 or 10 depending on the period. Each taxpayer had to do public service work for 
a given number of days each year, except those who could pay a fee in exchange 
for not working.), residential taxes and income taxes. Personal taxes account for 
44 percent of total colony revenue over 1907–1957. Finally, among personal taxes, the 
most important were capitation taxes, a per-person tax which was the same for all 
individuals regardless of income or wealth. Capitation taxes accounted for 39 percent 
of total colony revenue over 1907–1957. Income taxes, which were introduced in 1933 
in AOF, did not catch up with capitation tax revenue: in 1956 income taxes accounted 
for 25 percent of personal taxes whereas capitation taxes accounted for 75 percent of 
personal taxes. The general picture that emerges from the budget data is that local 
people, especially the poor, contributed significantly to public funding during colonial 
times.  
36  Huillery
APPENDIX FIGURE 1 
AOF REVENUE (FEDERATION AND COLONIES), 1907–1957 
Sources: Author’s calculations from colonial final accounts.
 Appendix Figure 1 shows the evolution of AOF total public revenue from 1907 
to 1957. The overall growth of AOF total revenue was slow from 1907 to 1945, 
with two significant downturns corresponding to the two World Wars. The decrease in 
AOF total revenue during the two World Wars was due to the decrease in trade taxes 
at the federation level as a consequence of worldwide trade contraction.  
 After 1945 the growth of AOF total revenue is spectacular: it was multiplied by five 
in 13 years. Both federation revenue and colony revenue grew quickly during this 
period, with federation revenue growing at an even faster rate than colony revenue. 
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